Last Thoughts on Social Capital (for now)

Even the past few weeks I have been examining a range of criticisms of social capital and I think the eight criticisms posted has demonstrated that concept of social capital has a number of serious weaknesses. The nature of its weakness is not that it is based on fallacious interpretations or incorrect descriptions but rather that it produces descriptions that retain unresolved tensions. Though perhaps like suspension bridges, such tensions are responsible for the concept’s strengths, indeed, Schuller, Baron and Field (2000) argue that weaknesses such as its definitional diversity and extreme versatility can in some contexts become strengths (Schuller, Baron and Field 2000: 24-25). They conclude that the concept is a useful heuristic and can help, in particular, in reinserting value into social science discourse, overcome disciplinary boundaries and provide a link between the micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. While these assertions are supported with some examples of empirical research, such claims are still rather vague and apply equally to social networks explanations, which at least have the benefits of clearer methods of analysis.

An earlier post began with a quote from Adler and Kwon, and it would be unfair to these authors not to mention that they concluded their review of the concept with a note of caution:

There does not, as yet, seem to be anything resembling a rigorous theory or metatheory that can incorporate the strengths of the existing, competing theories and transcend their respective limitations (Adler and Kwom 2002: 34)

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 8: the concept is difficult to operationalise, attempts to do so have been inconsistent and obscure the way more specific concepts have been applied.


The concept of social capital remains somewhat indistinct, but other imprecise concepts have been useful to the social sciences, often with their importance emerging though the process in which they become operationally defined, as with many of the core concepts of critical geography. To be useful to researchers, the concept of social capital has to be comparable from case to case, which leads to the crucial question of how the concept of social capital becomes operationalised in research. This problem can be exemplified by examining the way in which social capital research has been applied to the innovation process.

The process of innovation has been analysed in terms of technology networks, in particular the systems of innovation literature (e.g. Lunvall 1992) and social network (e.g. Obstfeld 2005). In relation to such networks, a sizable body of research suggests that social capital plays a key function in the innovation process, identifying its function in features such as learning and communicating, and developing relations based on trust (for example Maskall 2000; Landry, Amara, and Lamari 2002; Molina et. al. 2008). Peter Maskell, for example, focuses on the features that are built though sharing a common goal or connected by a mutual fate, stating:

Social capital enables firms to improve their innovation capability and conduct business transactions without much fuss and has, therefore, substantial implications for economic performance (Maskell 2000: 111)

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 7: Social capital, as outlined in the literature, can be a hindrance to economic success, with different types of negative externalities, barriers to meritocratic and efficient decision making. Social capital has a dark side.


A further set of problems for the concept of social capital relate to the negative effects of social networks. Social capital, as described by leading advocates such as Robert Putnam (2000), relates as much to the negative consequences of networks as to the positive but even though there is a growing recognition that often one person’s advantage from social capital is at the opportunity cost of the exclusion of another, most research emphasises the positive aspects of network relationships linked to social capital, though a growing amount of research addresses this imbalance (see Adler and Kwon 2002: 30-31; Portes 1998: 15-18; Quibria 2003: 29). So if the social capital thesis were correct, i.e. that greater participation in social networks provides more opportunities for participants and communities, this implies that there is a trade-off between features such as community solidarity and individual freedom, create barriers to meritocracy, while at the same time suggesting that increases in social capital also enable opportunities for pursuing negative or anti-social ends. Mancur Olson, for example, illustrated the way professional associations, trade unions and trade associations can sometimes hinder the economic opportunities of members by placing obligations and restrictions on their activity (Olson 1982) and other forms of limitations or negative externalities have been observed in much the same way as positive effects are said to emerge from social capital:

Sociability cuts both ways…it can also lead to public “bads.” Mafia families, prostitution and gambling rings, and youth gangs offer so many examples of how embeddedness in social structures can be turned to less than socially desirable ends (Portes 1998: 18)

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 6: Social capital is difficult enough to define, but it is impossible to measure.

Following from the difficulty of defining and mapping social capital’s network contours is another pressing problem: that of measurement and other empirical indications related to the amount, or the importance of recent changes, in the type and quantity of social capital. Neither social capital nor its effects can be accurately measured in comparable ways, with some very influential research based exclusively on oversimplified measures and misleading comparisons (see Maraffi1994; Morlino 1995). Other attempts require reconceptualising social capital as assets or resources embedded within networks or to the value of a position within such networks, though these surrogates are based upon valuations of wealth, power, and status or access to bridging facilities (see Lin 1999: 37-38) and, as such, are factors that are arbitrarily valued or difficult to determine or grossly oversimplified. The most cited measures and statistics are also those with the most narrow conception of the concept, i.e. those cited by Robert Putnam, in which large United States data sets, in particular the General Social Survey and other longitudinal, national surveys, are analysed in detail to detect changes in a number of key measurements to account for the decay of social capital and a decline in engagement in American society (Putnam 2000). Rather than giving clear indications of such change, the research data is, on closer inspection, inconclusive. In an attempt to reconstruct Putnam’s findings using the same measures as Putnam, though on a smaller scale (trust, voting, church attendance, organisation membership, meeting with neighbours and friends, philanthropic giving) Claude Fischer shows that the relationships between the variables Putnam associates with social capital is not supported by the data:

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 5: Related to the previous criticism of circularity is the problem of the direction of causality. Changes in social capital and changes in communities, even if they are related, it is difficult to show which direction causality originated.

While circumstantial evidence suggests that social capital, as measured in terms of active participation in associations that knit society together is associated with perceptions of decline in the community (see Putnam 2000) if the two are causally related, its direction that has not been fully resolved, as Steven Durlauf notes:

Do trust-building social networks lead to efficacious communities, or do successful communities generate these types of social ties? As far as I know, no study has been able to shed much light on this question (Durlauf 1999: 3)

More recently, a number of studies have attempted to provide a causal relationship using different methods (see, for example, Rose 2000; Mohan and Mohan 2002; Landry, Amara, and Lamari 2002); however, even these results are far from conclusive. The lack of precision concerning the causes and consequences of features associated with social capital is a direct consequence of operating a multiplicity of concepts under the same umbrella term. The importance of trust, social support and social exchange depend on different mechanisms and the nature of the interdependencies and feedback mechanisms that exist between these factors in different circumstances is not clarified by grouping them together as homogenous components. The complex nature of the interdependencies and feedback dynamics implies that linear descriptions of causality are unenlightening at best and in danger of presenting inappropriate policy instruments, and yet the literature, while acknowledging this challenge, neither address it, nor challenge the conventional direction of causality:

Eight Criticisms of Social Captial

Criticism 4: Social Capital is not an explanation but rather a tautology.

A key weakness, even for some of the most influential social capital explanations (for example Putnam 1993), is that they begin with the effects of social capital and describe the differences between positive and negative examples in terms of the way social capital has been responsible for producing these effects. These explanations are thus not explanations at all, but rather circular arguments. As Portes points out, when Putnam argues that a town is “civic” because it has civic participation and “incivic” if it doesn’t, it explains nothing since: “equating social capital with the resources acquired through it can easily lead to tautological statements” (Portes 1998: 5). Untangling the causes, effects, correlations and conjunctions is a difficult undertaking when dealing with networks and complex interdependencies, and bold claims should be based on theory, a mechanism, excellent case studies or other solid empirical findings, preferably triangulated with other data. And yet it is exactly the bold claims made on behalf of social capital that are gaining it currency (DeFilippis 2001: 801) claims based on co-location (Fischer 2005) the product of many additional factors that difficult to reduce to mere resources.

Furthermore, the research analysis into the loss of social capital is equally flawed in failing to consider or give attention to ways in which social relationships have found new ways of expressing themselves (see also Lin 1999: 43-48). Technology mediated communication through blogs, posting on message boards, or social networking, with its 500 million members, lead to social interaction, relationships, campaigning and dissemination of knowledge (see, for example, Williams and Gulati 2006). Robert Wuthnow, for example, shows that there are indeed changes in participation rather than a decline, with shifts from bureaucratic forms to more ad hoc forms of participation, which have manifested themselves in many forms that social capital research has not always picked up on (Wuthnow 1998). When it is convenient to explain change in terms of social capital-like ways, such intangible resources can be invokes, and yet when there is a need to show the absence of social capital, these networks and modes of communication can be conveniently downscaled in importance. Social capital interpreted as the “right kind of connectivity” can be a form of hindsight bias or confirmation bias even when it seems to be a cogent explanation.

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 3: Social capital is not an original concept, but rather a rebranding of a loose collection of themes related to trust and group participation from social psychology, sociology and economics – it isn’t a theory.

Different fields of research use the word “theory” to mean different things, though it is generally taken to mean an explanation or descriptive assertion related to specified events. While there might be disagreement on exactly might constitute a theory, social capital doesn’t seem to possess the characteristics that would make it a theory at all. After difficulties with the social and capital dimension of the concept, the failure to generate theoretical analysis is, as Bruno Latour said of the theory element of Actor Network Theory in 1999, the third nail in the coffin:

To a large extent social capital is “just” a powerful renaming and collecting together of a large swath of network research from the social support literature to social resource theory (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 993)

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 2: Social capital is a concept indicative of the colonisation of sociological territory by fundamentally economic notions – it isn’t social.

While scholars identify sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman as key figures in the development of social capital, there is the suggestion that it remains a fundamentally economic concept, fitting closely with the work of rational choice economists, such as Gary Becker, and, as such, is a Trojan horse through which mainstream economists seek, like Becker, to occupy terrain that had been the preserve of sociologists.

using the phrase probably allows sociologists more access to the ears and wallets of the powers-that-be than simply writing about, say, friendship and church attendance. On the other hand, the term has reciprocally allowed economists to colonize sociologists’ topics (Fischer 2005: 157)

Economists engaging with other social scientists could be a potentially a profitable undertaking for social science if new insights emerge within a collaborative exercise, but the notion of social capital is not engagement, but the application of an undiluted economic description on otherwise social terrain. In this way social capital is not an expansion though economic considerations, but a reduction to economic thinking. Ben Fine and Francis Green develop a similar argument, arguing that as well as being indicative of an unhealthy colonisation of the other social sciences by economics, social capital is also based on a reductionist argument. They argue that the concept is “reductionist across a number of dimensions: to the individual, to utility maximisation and to universal categories” (Fine and Green 2000: 91). Indeed, even without this direct reduction to economic concepts that Fine and Green identify, social capital can be perceived as a reductionist concept even when its use purports to give a “social context” to relationships. This is because it erases the social in order to introduce the component used to contextualise it – simultaneously reifying the social and reducing it to characteristics of something else (see also Latour 2005: 3-6). Turning to Fine again:

That “social” is attached to capital to mark a distinct category is indicative of the failure to understand capital as social in its economic, putatively non-social form (Fine 2002: 797)

Eight Criticisms of Social Capital

Criticism 1: Social capital is a concept based on a misleading metaphor – it isn’t capital

Social capital seems to be different from other types of capital as described by economists. While this need not be a problem for the concept if it is coherently explained in relation to other forms of capital, or as a complementary part of the family of capitals, its difference to the convention notion of capital has been acknowledged but rarely interrogated. One example of such an interrogation is found in economist Kenneth Arrow’s work (Arrow 1999). Arrow argues that the word “capital” implies three elements: extension in time; an intended sacrifice for deferred benefit; alienability. Arrow concludes that the concept of social capital lacks each of the three elements required to be a genuine example of capital and therefore found no reason for “adding something called ‘social capital’ to other forms of capital” (Arrow 1999: 4). Further to this, those outside economics recognise that the difference with other forms of capital weaken the explanatory power of the concept through confusion with the functions of other forms of capital. For example Samuel Bowles argues that while the concept “social capital” might describe important relationships, the term itself and the way it is conceptualised in the literature, is so unlike other forms of capital that the term “social capital” should be abandoned:

“Capital” refers to a thing possessed by individuals; even a social isolate like Robinson Crusoe had an axe and a fishing net. By contrast, the attributes said to make up social capital—such as trust, commitment to others, adhering to social norms and punishing those who violate them—describe relationships among people (Bowles 1999: 6)

Are we still talking about Social Capital?

The issue I'll be addressing in the coming weeks relate to the question "are we still talking about social capital" and if so, why. I am motivated to ask these questions as I have noticed that another "range"of papers has been published on social capital in 2012, even though they seem collectively to be uncritical of the concept. The concept of social capital emerged as an influential research theme in a number of disciplines in the past twenty or so years, as measured by the exponential growth in social capital literature throughout the 1990s the 2000s, which continues even in 2012. While some of the assumptions of social capital theory have been challenged individually, its limitations as a unified concept have not been adequately tackled within the academic literature. In this blog I’m going to attempt to address this challenge, identifying key questions that the concept needs to tackle.

Social capital is more than the sum of the various kinds of relationships that we entertain, and a social capital lens, therefore, can reveal features of reality that otherwise remain invisible (Adler and Kwom 2002: 36)

The use of the concept of social capital as a tool of analysis for social scientists is relatively recent but already has a wide variety of meanings and uses across a range of disciplines (see Portes 1998; Woolcock 1998; Borgatti and Foster 2003). As might be expected with a concept treated so broadly as to be an explanation for a multiplicity of social changes and a panacea for pressing social problems, a number of weaknesses have been identified in different aspects of the concept and its use (Durlauf 1999; Schuller, Baron and Field 2000; Fine 2002) and yet notwithstanding these critiques, the concept has expanded into new areas of social science research, with the number of articles and citations continuing to grow (see Forsman 2005 Widén-Wulff 2007).

Assemblages - a framework for social networks

As I described last month, we are collectively engaged in networks that encompass social systems and populations (macro level) as well as individual action and uniquely occurring interactions (micro level). The problem of scale is how to hold the macro and micro together without reducing the macro to a series of micro epiphenomena or erasing the micro by reducing it to the functions of social forces. As Mark Granovetter observed:

A fundamental weakness of current sociological theory is that it does not relate macro-level interactions to micro-level patterns in any convincing way" (Granovetter 1973: 1360).

Granovetter’s criticism still applies to much of contemporary social and organisational theory. Many of the “solutions” to this problem simply defer the reductionism from the macro to the meso level such as with Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration (Giddens 1986), the concept of (transformative) praxis (Bhaskar 1997), the notion of the routine within the multi-level perspective (Nelson and Winter 1977) or by different forms of conflation based on act aggregation or agent orchestration (see Archer 1995: 93-134). Network theory might offer a promising alternativeand yet network theory itself possesses the same weakness. The problem of addressing the limitations of existing network theories can be coupled with this requirement to develop a theoretical solution to the problem of scale. It is for this reason that I have built on the concept of the assemblage as a theoretical framework for network theory. While many of the features of assemblages are found in existing network descriptions, unlike existing network theories, the concept of the assemblage was not developed from fragmented theories with different supporting ontological assumptions, but devised with a clear purpose and directed towards a specific problematic within a unified philosophical scheme, though one which is complex and requires a series of steps in order to be fully conceptualised (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 323-337).

Social Networks and their Limitations

My research interests, as applied to assessing green innovation, technology, clusters, strategic alliances or policy development, etc. is based upon understanding the social networks that afford the relationships on which these new ideas or innovations emerge. This month I’ll introduce a few academic considerations about social networks, while next month I’ll try to explain how I’m trying to develop a corrective to the limitations that social network thinking needs to solve if it is to be an effective explanation of the interdependencies that it describes.

Attempts to describe and explain the social interactions that support organisations and other social phenomena make use of a variety of models and methods. There are, though, a limited number of paradigms that dominate the literature, and among these, emerging as the market leader, is that of the network. Stephen Borgatti and Pacey Foster illustrate the exponential growth of network-based research outputs with bibliometric data (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 992), arguing that the network paradigm forms part of a more general move “away from individualist, essentialist and atomistic explanations toward more relational, contextual and systemic understandings” (Borgatti and Foster 2003: 991). In this moth’s blog I will briefly examine some of the key features of network theory. The network paradigm does not represent a unified approach to research; network models are themselves diverse but share characteristics and assumptions. The use of such models in addressing the issue of innovation (the theme of this paper) seems a sensible choice as networks are able to capture a sense of the interdependencies of organisations and the channels of exchange that enable the relationships necessary for innovation to develop and be maintained (Freeman 1991). Equally, network descriptions can be applied to a variety of innovation-related phenomena. Examples include Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996), who use network patterns to describe the growth in corporate partnerships and external collaboration and the purpose such relationships serve, while Bengt-Åke Lundvall, with a very different approach to organisational adaptation, uses network descriptions to exemplify the process of knowledge transfer and learning between different firms (see Lundvall 1992).

Come off it, REF!

The REF could have an influence on how academics engage with non academics

This post isn't about what is happening on various football fields but on different academic fields. The REF in question (Research Excellence Framework) is in many ways an improvement over the previous Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), with 20% of the assessment based upon the impact of research on non academics. There is, however, a catch: the research not only needs to have a justifiable impact but must also be published in academic journals with an impact factor. Departments noted for their excellent work with the general public, policy makers, business people, practitioners will not be credited by the REF unless the research they develop to help such stakeholders is published in journals used almost exclusively by (a small number of) academics. Why is this a problem? My view is that building a field or developing a discipline is not able to develop in an inclusive way if it follows the Kuhnian approach to research termed “normal science” based on past scientific achievements that the appropriate academic community acknowledges as a foundation for its practice. Kuhn describes these achievements, or “paradigms” as both sufficiently unprecedented to attract a group of adherents away from competing modes of academic research, but, at the same time, sufficiently open-ended to leave various problems for the community of research practitioners to address. Paradigms, in this way, thus help academic communities to demarcate their discipline. They do so, Kuhn argues, by creating avenues of inquiry, helping to formulate research questions, directing the selection of methods appropriate to these questions, defining areas of relevance, structuring the fact gathering process and identifying acceptable technologies appropriate for research. A paradigm also acts to draw in individuals to act as advocates. These advocates and followers are then transformed into a research community, a profession or a discipline as the paradigm becomes accepted and gains credibility. This occurs, Kuhn argues, through the formation of journals, societies or specialist groups, which develop the discipline through articles that are directed to their colleagues who accept the paradigm, rather than needing to justify the concepts, questions, and methods from first principles. This professionalism is supported by the community using its expertise to claim, both for themselves and their paradigm, a place in the academic establishment.

The cultural branding of Climate Change campaigns?

Brands are not just efficient communication tools

While the business application of new modes of branding have been explored in detail, the cultural and communication implications are perhaps even more significant and yet remain an under researched area.  Branding is no longer the simple art of product differentiation using a pleasant logo or clever product name.  Since the development of the mass media, branding has become a key driver in the process of the globalisation of product development and promotion strategy, but also the communication of ideas, cultural icons and social movements.  With the integration of ICT, low cost multimedia and extensive knowledge networks, the way in which branding has traditionally been used to promote products has been revolutionised, but the strategies that have supported the added value that we as consumers attribute to the products/services can now be extended to a range of cultural activities and identities as though they were commodities.  Likewise, the sophistication of consumers has meant that successful branding strategies depend upon the ability of a brand to resonate with complex, and shifting, cultural values.  The merging of these two tendencies has meant that cultural branding, and the branding of culture, are now interdependent forces in the social mediascape in which contemporary life is represented and performed.

What is E3MG?

E3MG sounds complicate - it is!

One of the key areas of research that 4CMR is involved with is E3 modelling.  Over the past few years one of the central models, E3MG (Energy-Environment-Economy (E3) Model for the Globe), has been improved as part of a concerted effort by the core research group.  In the near future the improved model will be used to assess policy scenarios related to carbon emissions.  Many of the people who follow this blog will have a vague idea of what such a model is, but this month I will be introducing the model in more detail.  If you are interested in climate change debates but are turned off by the technical details of econometric modelling, then perhaps this month’s blog article is not for you.

OK, so what is E3MG? The model is one of a suite of E3 models maintained and improved by Cambridge Centre for Climate Change Mitigation Research (4CMR) and Cambridge Econometrics under the guidance of Terry Barker.  Each of the models within this suite has a specific territorial focus; E3MG extends coverage across the globe. 

Emissions Reduction Strategies: How to Choose the Right Policy Mix

Policy makers must ensure that the policy mix does not promote conflicting incentives

The types of policies used to reduce carbon emissions will differ over time as some issues emerge as more powerful problems to be addressed, requiring new solutions.  Policies can be national or regional, or require international cooperation: bilateral, multinational or at the global scale.  Climate change mitigation is clearly a global problem, but one which includes national consideration such as energy, transport, land use and manufacturing policy, and as such, domestic and international policies will be needed to provide incentives for mitigation. 

There are many methods and procedures that form a part of policy but are not legally enforced.  Awareness campaigns, education and information dissemination, social movements, awards, and climate action naming and shaming might each enrol people or organisations to take action to reduce emissions.  Other potentially effective ways of reducing carbon emissions without recourse to legally binding policy include voluntary commitments, schemes or agreements, contracts, and, sanctions for failure to comply with agreed targets. 

While these strategies might play a role in the policy mix, I’ll consider just three types of high impact policy, those aimed in particular at reducing emissions from energy use: Imposed standards, market instruments and financial instruments.

Climate science models and the scientific method: experimentation verses deduction?

Is this science and is it valid: What would Thomas Hobbes think?

In Hobbes view, Boyle’s experimental solution to the problem of order was not possible; it was not effective; and it was dangerous. (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 80-81).

In discussing the methods of climate science, the use of models and the process of simulation are often mentioned as either a key strength or key weakness of the science.  While climate models receive a great deal of attention (and funding), they are generally a very marginal part of the science – much more time is spent examining actual data, identifying relevant data sources, developing statistical methods and making sure that observations and calculations are contextualised in terms of other data sets.  The fact that some statistical methods assessing correlations in actual data is also called modelling is confusion.

By modelling, I will refer here only to simulation using models, a type of experimentation.  I will contrast modelling with the statistical analysis of actual data to determine specific correlations that does not depend on extrapolation or simulation.  While examples of either approach can be contested, the issue I am concerned with here is the validity of simulation and experimentation using models in climate science.  This issue is fundamental if we are to understand the criteria such modelling must meet if it is to follow the scientific method. 

The scientific method seems to be one of the more straightforward issues in climate science - we all know what the scientific method is, right? We agree with the Oxford English Dictionary that it is “a method of procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses” I assume.  But let's go back to the 17th Century for a moment to understand the emergence of the concept.  The status of experimentation was the source of an important dispute between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes during the 1660s and 1670s.  The disagreement between Boyle and Hobbes is analysed in great detail by Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer in their book Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Shapin and Schaffer 1985).  The book examines, among many its themes, the boundaries and methods of science in relation to questions of political philosophy.  This is a good place to start because there were two competing approaches to “the” scientific method, best expressed in terms of the relationship between scientist Robert Boyle and the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, or rather the science and political thought of Boyle and the political thought and science of Hobbes.  Hobbes and Boyle are key figures in the Enlightenment tradition, their approach to method being that of the mechanistic philosophy while their epistemology developed along similar lines within the rationalist tradition, but where they differ is in the status of experimentation itself.

Holocaust Denial and Climate Change Denial - part 1

Climate Change? - Its all down to sunspots, right

One thing that should be made very clear: any attempt to try to link the views of those who oppose the conventional climate science to Nazism in any form is misguided and unfair. Goodwin's law of Nazi analogies (sometimes stated as follows: as an online discussion grows longer, the probability involving a comparison with the Nazis or Hitler approaches 1) implies that such comparisons are overused and by trying to create guilt by association with the word "denial" is in my view an example of Goodwin's law and its corollary that we should avoid glib association of a point of view with the Nazis. Holocaust denial is often part of a strategy to disassociate the extreme right with the systematic murder of millions of people in order to make an extreme right wing or anti-Semitic agenda more attractive. Holocaust denial historians ignore evidence or rely on fabricated evidence and they imply the existence of huge conspiracy theory on the part of eye witnesses and conventional historians. Those who voice opposition to the conventional views of climate science do so for many motives, as I discuss elsewhere, but however superficially similar the methods of some opponents of the conventional climate science could ever be to those of holocaust deniers, they could never have the same sneer at suffering that exemplifies the nasty agenda underlying their falsification of history.  In short calling the opponents of the conventional view of climate science “deniers” as a smear strategy is wrong.

The reality, though, is that names matter, which is why name calling matters: coining the right name for your opponents, or the object of your opposition is crucial - in the UK the expression "Franken food" still resonates with the general public when considering genetically modified foods, and in the abortion debate, both sides control their image by stating they are pro something - and controlling your own name is an important part of controlling your image, which is why enhanced interrogation techniques are sanctioned, not torture, why politicians only ever misspeak, fudge or are economical with the truth, why the Climate Research Unit email controversy is framed as "Climategate" and why holocaust deniers prefer to be called revisionists. Pejorative names have been coined and applied to those who believe that anthropogenic climate change is a reality, including the climate scientists whose research illustrates a clear link: alarmists, warmists, true believers or team hockystick. The implication is clear: add a context to the opponents' view (alarm, warming rather than climate change, dogmatic, imply the hockystick graph is based on bad science) and extra ( negative) information is coupled to the label. Instead those who hold this view prefer the expressions "the consensus view" or express their beliefs in terms of the scientific consensus in general to indicate that the basic science is settled. The implication of this is also clear - the argument is over, the science says anthropogenic climate change is happening, reduce emissions or face the consequences.

Engaging Stakeholders in Climate Change

The relationship between universities and society has changed in recent years.  In most developed economies the university has become a key strand in the triple helix, complementing the added value to the economy provided by business and government elements.  Universities provide training and expertise as well as an infrastructure for high quality research, and thus such research is no longer to be thought of as pure, neutral and uncorrupted by the inconvenience and practicalities of life, if indeed it ever had such higher aspirations. 

In the UK, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) has introduced an impact element for evaluating university research in the next round of assessment in 2014, called the Research Excellence Framework (REF).  Universities will need to show that their research is not just addressing the needs of academics (it needs to do that too!) nor just available to the general public or passively disseminated to “stakeholders” but that the research has informed and impacted business, policy makers and other key decision makers in a decisive way. 

Climate change research has the potential to change the way different organisations conduct themselves, make policy and change behaviour from the individual to the largest corporation and government in the world.  This raises a small number of important questions:

A) What are climate-change researchers/research groups doing to engage with (for lack of a better word) stakeholders?

B) What should climate change research groups be doing to engage with stakeholders?

C) What incentives can be used to make the answer to question A and B the same?

Let’s begin with question B.  Those opposed to doing anything to mitigate possible effects of climate change will say that they should stay out of policy making or producing propaganda for activists.  Those in favour of addressing the problems they perceive to be the key threat in our lifetime, generally favour climate researchers becoming, if not advocates for a programme and activists for its implementation, then working closely with such groups.  The answer to this question is thus political, and will depend as much on ideology as on the responsibility such knowledge implies.

Climate Change for Football (or Soccer) Fans

 Paul Haynes in conversation with James Atkins

Climate change policy is certainly an issue that receives attention – the search term generates more than half a million hits; however, a similar search for “Manchester United” generates nearly 100 million, and they are only 1 of the 92 professional football clubs in England.  This statistic seems to support my prejudice that football supporters (like myself – Wolverhampton Wanderers in case you wondered) are involved with their club in ways that very few issues can match.  If climate change apathy is the problem (and the blog title gives a clue about my view), the question is could we learn anything about the enthusiasm and engagement of football fans.  It turns out that someone else (a Manchester United fan no less) has already thought about this and written a book about football fans, for football fans that also examines climate change policy issues.  The novel, which I’m reading at the moment, is a well observed and comical story about individuals with a passion for football, and another with a passion for addressing climate change, and how they learn from each other.  I caught up with the author, James Atkins, to ask him about the motives for writing his book:

Climate Change for Football Fans is an attempt to talk about climate change policy, a dull subject, in a more palatable way: a chocolate digestive in a world of Lincolns.  In the last ten years working in emissions trading I have thought a lot about environmental problems and climate change and what governments and individuals can do about them. I have also written about this in articles and in my blog The Bustard.  Then a friend suggested that I compile the blog entries into a book in order to expand the readership.  Not wanting to repeat what had already been written I started reading around the topic.

I found that books and reports on climate change policy are an uphill struggle.  Few books on climate change are readable or enjoyable, despite it being an extremely important topic. So I tried to find a way of making the book more entertaining.  This was partly through putting dialogue and humour in it, and partly through introducing the loose parallel of another subject.

The book is a series of conversations between Joe, a Burnley lad who is football mad, and Professor Igor who's obsessed with climate change.